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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, D. H. 
Whittenburg, Chairman, and Layton 
Maxfield and H. J. Corleissen, mem-
bers of the STATE ROAD COM-
_MISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HYRUlVI A. DANIELSON and OLIV-
IA B. DANIELSON, his wife; and 
C. ELLS\VORTH HANSEN and 
FLORENCE HANSEN, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Civil No. 7752 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State of Utah, by and through the State Road Com-
mission, instituted this proceeding under the constitution and 
statutes of the State of Utah, to condemn certain portions 
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of defendants' properties in Salt Lake County near 6200 South 
and Highland Drive Streets deemed necessary for the im-
provement of State Route No. 152. The property rights of 
the defendants which were deemed necessary to be taken for 
the completion of the state highway improvement project are 
set forth in paragraph III of the complaint (R. 2) which 
embodies the Resolution duly and regularly passed and 
adopted by the State Road Commission. 
After a hearing in the manner prescribed by law, the 
State of Utah was granted an Order of Immediate Occupancy 
(R. 16, 17) permitting it to take immediate possession of the 
properties of the defendants in order to do such work thereon 
as was necessary to accomplish the purpose for which said 
properties were sought to be condemned. 
Prior to the time the cases were actually tried for the 
purpose, primarily, of determining the amount of just com-
pensation to which each of the defendants was entitled as 
guaranteed by Article I Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, 
the defendants C: Ellsworth Hansen and Florence Hansen 
made a written Motion for an Order of the Court that the 
claims against the defendants be severed and proceeded with 
separately (R. 27). -Although this Motion was never formally 
ruled upon the plaintiff likewise made a written Demand that 
the cases be set for separate jury trials (R. 33). Nevertheless, 
over the objection of plaintiff (R. 3 5) the two cases were con-
solidated for purposes of trial. Both parties did agree how-
ever that the cases could be tried by the Court rather than 
by a jury. 
At the trial it was stipulated that the public interest and 
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necessity did not require the acquisition of all the property 
of the defendants Hyrum A. Danielson and Olivia B. Daniel-
~; son embodied in plaintiff's complaint (R. 161). The Findings 
ti of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment of the Court 
< with reference to the condemnation of the property of Hyrum 
~ A. Danielson and Olivia B. Danielson were rendered in ac-
tt cordance with the aforesaid stipulation (R. 300-305). 
This appeal is brought to review the Rulings, Orders and 
Judgment of the District Court which it is respectfully sub-
::: mitted were contrary to law and prejudicial to the substantial 
111 rights of the State of Utah (R. 302, 307) . 
• 
ll 
II 
lel 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSOLIDATING THE 
CASES FOR PURPOSES OF TRIAL. 
II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING INTEREST AT 
THE RATE OF Slfo FROM THE DATE OF THE ORDER 
OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY UNTIL THE DATE OF 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 
III 
THE JUDGMENT AS TO VALUE IS NOT SUBSTAN- _ 
TIA TED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
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IV 
THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGlviENT IS EXCESSIVE 
AND CONTRARY TO LAW BECAUSE BASED UPON 
ERRONEOUS RULINGS INDICATING BIAS AND PREJU-
DICE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSOLIDATING THE 
CASES FOR PURPOSES OF TRIAL. 
Plaintiff recognizes that Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure authorizes a consolidation of cases for trial 
purposes whenever they involve a common question of law 
or fact. The only common question of law or fact in these 
cases however is that they are both condemnation cases in-
stituted by the State of Utah. All other issues of law and 
fact, including the necessity for the taking and the amount 
of compensation to which each of the defendants would be 
entitled, have nothing whatever in common. It is uniformly 
recognized that each piece of real property is unique. The 
defendants themselves are in a poor position to now claim 
that the two cases involved common issues of law and fact 
because the defendants Danielsons challenged the necessity 
for taking a portion of their property (R. 48-51, 131-144) 
as to which the proceedings were later abandoned by stipula-
tion of the parties (R. 161) and the defendants Hansens moved 
the Court for an order severing the cases (R. 27) thus ex-
6 
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pressly recognizing that there were few if any common issues 
of law and fact. While the Court does have considerable dis-
cretion in consolidating cases for trial purposes whenever there 
are common issues of law and fact, and whenever the con-
venience of the parties would be best subserved thereby, it is 
respectfully submitted that it was just as erroneous and preju-
dicial to consolidate these cases for trial purposes as it would 
be two different assault and battery cases involving the same 
plaintiff and different defendants. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING INTEREST AT 
. THE RATE OF B7o FROM THE DATE OF THE ORDER 
OF HviMEDIATE OCCUPANCY UNTIL THE DATE OF 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 
On numerous occasions this Honorable Court has recog-
nized that in condemnation cases the party whose property 
is taken is entitled to interest on the award only from the date 
of entry or occupation of the premises by the condemnor. So 
far as we have been able to determine the only ruling by this 
Court as to the rate of interest allowable was in the case of 
Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Jones, 29 U. 147, 80 Pac. 732, 
where the question as to the rate of interest was not in dispute. 
In that case the interest question which was involved was 
as to whether the defendant was entitled to interest from 
the date of the service of the summons. The Court ruled 
that the defendant was entitled to interest at the rate of 
sro from the date of entry or occupation of the property 
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only and not from the date of the service of the summons. 
At the time that case was decided the legal rate of interest 
was S7o- See Section 1241, Revised Statutes of Utah 1898. 
Today the legal rate of interest is 67o- See Section 44-0-1, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943. 
Under the Constitution and Eminent Domain statutes of 
this state there is no ·provision which specifies the rate of 
interest to which a person is entitled from the date his property 
is taken to the date of the deterimnation of the award. After 
the determination of the award the statutes dealing with the 
rate of interest allow interest on the award or judgment at 
the rate of 87c,. See Section 44-0-4 Utah Code Annotated, 
1943. While some constitutional or statutory provisions ex-
pressly prescribe the rate of interest to which a person is • 
entitled from the date his property is taken in eminent domain 
proceedings until the date of the award, in the absence of 
such provisions it is generally recognized that he is entitled 
to either the "going rate of interest" or the "legal rate." In 
the case of Simms v. Dillon, ____ W.Va. ____ , 193 S. E. 331, 1E 
A.L.R. 787, involving constitutional and statutory provisions 
similar to those of this state which do not expressly authorize 
the payment of interest during the interim between the taking 
of the land and the actual payment of compensation, the 
Supreme Court of West Virginia had this to say about the 
constitutionality of such statutes and also the rate of interest 
allowed during such period: 
I 
;) 
~I 
" * * * under the authority of the foregoing opinions 1! 
and cases, chapter 122 of the 193 7 Acts of the Legis-
lature of West Virginia is not unconstitutional because 
it does not expressly provide for the payment of in- rr 
·8 
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terest during the interim between the taking of the 
land and the actual payment of compensation. Under 
the authority of these cases, it is not necessary to so 
provide in the statute setting up the eminent domain 
procedure, but such right to interest is implied, and 
it will become the duty of the court entering the final 
award to provide for the payment of interest at the 
legal rate during the time between the taking and the 
final payment of the money due. (Emphasis added.) 
Also in the case of In re Bronx River Parkway in City of New 
York, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 53, 259 App. Div. 552, affirmed 284 
N.Y. 48, 29 N.E. 2d 465, the court had the following to say 
about the rate of interest allowed during the time between 
the taking and the final payment of the money in eminent 
domain cases: 
"The right to just compensation is, of course, the 
controlling factor. No statute may interfere with or 
prejudice that right. On April 25, 1938, when title 
vested herein, the property owner's right to just com-
pensation, including proper interest, became a vested 
property right. The statutes of this State recognize that 
right and provided interest should be added to an 
award for the property taken. Administrative Code, 
Sec. B15-28.0; Section 296 of the Tax Law; General 
Business Law Section ;.70. The statutory rate of in-
terest is not controlling if some other rate is required 
to meet the constitutional requirement for just com-
pensation. Prima facie, however, the legal rate would 
be a proper rate." (Emphasis added.) 
See also State by State Road Commission v. Painter, 120 W.Va. 
486, 199 S.E. 373 and U. S. v. A Certain Tract or Parcel of 
Land in Chatha'm County, 57 F. Supp. 30. As noted, at the 
present time the legal rate of interest is 6Cfo, which is the 
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maximum the court should have allowed in these cases from 
the Order of Immediate Occupancy until the entry of the 
Judgment. See Section 44-0-1 Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
POINT III 
THE JUDGMENT AS TO VALUE IS NOT SUBSTAN-
TIATED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The only evidence submitted by the defendants as to 
the value of their properties was that of Mr. C. Francis Solo-
mon, Jr. His determination of value however was made as 
of June 20, 1951, almost a year subsequent to the date of 
the service of the Summons upon the defendants which is 
the date our statutes require the determination of value to 
be made. See Section 104-61-12 Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
(now Section 104-34-11 of the Judicial Code.) The examina-
tion of :Mr. Solomon adduced the following testimony: 
Q. Mr. Solomon, in computing these figures for dam-
ages to property of Mr. Danielson and Mr. Hansen, 
as of what dates did you take ·values ? 
(Objections-discussion). 
A. The date of values I have taken as of June 20, 1951 
on values of property. (Emphasis added.) 
The record shows too that during the interim between July 
14, 1950 and June 20, 1951 it was a period of rising real 
estate prices. The Summons was served upon the defendants 
on July 14, 1950 (R. 7, 8) which under our statutes is the 
date for the determination of value. Because the appraisal 
10 
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of Mr. Solomon was not made in accordance with the law 
of this state the plaintiff moved that his testimony be stricken 
from the record, which motion was erroneously denied by the 
Court (R. 198 and 293). The only other evidence which was 
introduced by the defendants as to the value of their property 
was the testimony of Mrs. Danielson as to the value of the 
fruit trees upon her property separate and apart from the 
value of the land itself (R. 156-163). The authorities uni-
formly recognize that this may not be done. See Nichols on 
Eminent Domain, Vol. 4, page 240. The remaining evidence 
in the record as to the value of defendants' properties is 
the evidence which was· introduced by the plaintiff and which 
shows a much smaller value than the amount of the award which 
was made by the Court. The award made by the Court was 
even in excess of the highest values testified to by Mr. Solomon. 
Even assuming that the testimony of Mr. Solomon was 
admissible and should not be stricken from the record, the 
trial court in awarding damages to the defendants' Danielsons, 
exceeded the maximum amount testified to by him. The 
damage allowed by the Court to the Danielsons for loss of 
use for business was $1990 (R. 299) whereas his testimony 
limited this damage to $17 40 ( R. 92) . The damage allowed 
by the Court for the land taken was $647 (R. 299), whereas 
his testimony limited this damage to $520 (R. 93). The 
damage allowed by the Court for the cost of fill was $580 
(R. 299) whereas his testimony limited this damage to $562 
(R. 93). Mr. Solomon testified that there was a total damage 
of $~·,167 exclusive of pipe needed to connect with the water 
main (R. 94). In this figure he included the sum of $350 
for the loss of a wall (R. 94) which, by stipulation of the 
11 
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parties (R. 161), was not taken and which was specifically 
excluded from the legal description of the land condemned 
by the state in the Judgment which was rendered (R. 300-305). 
If the sum of $350, the value of the wall on the property of 
the defendants Danielsons which was not taken, is excluded 
from the total damages testified to by Mr. Solomon, the re- '1, 
sulitng damage is $2,817, which is the maximum the court 
could have awarded the Danielsons, exclusive of the cost of ~~: 
installing needed additional pipe to connect with the water ~· 
main. The evidence which is in the record, however, does 
not in any way justify or support the award which was made ·,I 
for the taking of Danielson's property. :~ 
POINT IV 
THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT IS EXCESSIVE 
AND CONTRARY TO LAW BECAUSE BASED UPON 
ERRONEOUS RULINGS INDICATING BIAS AND PREJU-
DICE. 
During the course of the trial the court made numerous 
rulings over the objection of plaintiff which it is respectfully 
submitted prejudiced the substantial rights of the plaintiff. 
Over the strenuous objection of plaintiff the Court per-
mitted the defendants to introduce evidence as to the value of 
the trees upon the land sought to be taken separate and apart 
from the value of the land itself (R. 156-163). The general 
rule recognized by all the authorities is that such growths 
cannot be separately evaluated independently of the value 
of the land. See United States v. Meyer, 113 F (2d) 387, 
12 
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cert. den. 311 U. S. 706, 85 L. Ed. 459, 61 S. Ct. 174; Long 
Distance Tel., etc. Co. v. Schmidt, 157 Ala. 391, 47 So. 731; 
Farmers' Reservoir etc. Co. v. Cooper, 54 Colo 402, 130 Pac. 
1004; Forest Reserve District v. Caraher, 209 Ill. 11, 132 
N.E. 211; Case v. State Highway Comm., 156 Kan. 163, 131 
P 2d 696; Louisville etc R. Co. v. Asher, 10 Ky. L. 1021; 
Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Hillman, 198 So. 
565; Manda v. Delaware etc. R. Co., 89 N.J.L. ~·27, 98 Atl. 
467; Ribak v. State, 38 N.Y.S. 2~ 869; Indiana Sav. etc. Co. 
v. Pa. R. Co. 229 Pa. 484, 78 Atl. 1039; Fort Worth R. Co. 
v. Gilmore, 2 S.W. 2d 543. After the Court had erroneously 
admitted the testimony of Mrs. Danielson as to the value of 
the trees upon her property, it then arbitrarily refused to per-
mit plaintiff to introduce any testimony as to the value of 
these trees which plaintiff attempted to do in rebuttal merely 
for the purpose of showing how ridiculously high defendants' 
figures actually were (R. 271-274). 
The defendants Danielsons also introduced evidence that 
they were damaged because the newly improved road required 
them to pay for the cost of installing additional pipe to make 
the water connections to which they were previously entitled. 
As part of their testimony both Mr. and Mrs. Danielson desig-
nated the exact locations where they wanted the connections 
made (R. 152 and 195, 196). It was also stipulated by the 
parties that the reasonable cost for installing pipe of the type 
required was $1.50 per running foot (R. 186). In spite of 
the fact that the evidence revealed the third connection de-
sired by the Danielsons could have been made just as readily 
to the main on the North as to the main on the East (R. 286, 
287) and thus would not require the laying of any more pipe 
13 
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for that connection than was required before the highway 
was improved, the Court granted damages for laying a total 
of 129 feet of pipe rather than for a total of 58 feet of pipe 
which would have been proper under the circumstances. 
In connection with the examination of Mr. Solomon, de-
fendants' expert on value, the Court, over plaintiff's objection, 
permitted counsel for the defendants to question him on 
numerous details as to the basis upon which his appraisals 
were made, which line of questioning is not permitted on 
direct examination but is limited to cross-examination for 
the purpose of testing the weight and credibility to which 
such testimony is entitled. Apparently it was on the basis of 
this improper direct examination that the Court formed its 
opinion that the examination of the properties by the expert 
witnesses for the plaintiff were "somewhat superficial" and 
that the examination made by defendants' expert witness was 
"critical, exhaustive, and detailed" (R. 299). An examination 
of the record, however, reveals that the expert witnesses for 
the plaintiff made detailed and exhaustive examinations of 
the properties both before and after the highway had been 
improved while the expert for the defendants had not even 
viewed the properties until after the project was completed 
and then he made his determination of value almost a whole 
year subsequent to the date the statute requires that it should 
be made in a condemnation case. 
, The record shows also that the Court, over the objection 
of the plaintiff, permitted the defendants, as part of their 
main case in establishing the value of their properties, to 
introduce into evidence the sales price of a piece of land 
14 
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It 
I 
It 
l: 
iill' 
:it 
involved in an isolated real estate transaction and in which 
the party admitted that he considered he secured an extra 
good deal but which had no bearing whatsoever on the value 
of defendants 'properties (R. 67-70). 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the evidence in the record, and in view 
of the settled law on the matter, it is respectfully submitted 
that prejudicial error was committed in the trial of these cases 
which errors are reflected in the Rulings and Orders of the 
Court and the Judgment rendered at the conclusion of the 
trial. The cases should therefore be reversed and remanded 
for new trials in accordance with the directions of this Honor-
able Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
J. LAMBERT GIBSON, 
Anistant Attorney General 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON, 
Assistant Attorney General 
JCO, 
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